Introduction
During the course of the past two decades official projections of national identity in Mexico have undergone important changes. By the early 1990s a state discourse characteristic of post-revolutionary nationalism focused on the existence of a mestizo nation 1 was superseded as legislation was approved which recognized Mexico as a multicultural nation. This was considered by many as a victory for the Mexican Indian movement and was also claimed as a triumph by the Zapatista guerrillas. However, this supposed shift to official acceptance of multiculturalism is far from free of contradictions. In some cases, 'pro-indigenous' legislation -provisions recognizing the right of indigenous people to their own norms and practices (usos y costumbres) -has, in practice, worked to the disadvantage of weak and marginalized groups within indigenous communities. In particular, indigenous women now face the dual task of defending their rights to their own culture vis-à-vis the Mexican state, while at the same time questioning essentialist and static perceptions of 'culture' and 'tradition' within the Indian movement that have negative implications for the full realization of women's 2 rights. This paper analyzes some of the dilemmas facing indigenous women in Chiapas in their struggle for rights within the new macro-political context of multiculturalism.
Linked to this, it examines the ways in which certain academic paradigms used to analyze indigenous normative systems can impede the development of proposals for reform to ensure greater access to justice for indigenous women.
The political debate over the right of indigenous peoples to cultural difference, selfdetermination, and autonomy gathered new strength after 1 January 1994, when Mayan peasants in the South-East of Mexico rose up against a national project they considered centralist and exclusive. This indigenous movement, known as the Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN) (Zapatista National Liberation Army) violently rejected the neo-liberal policies promoted by the government of President Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988 Gortari ( -1994 . Organized indigenous women have taken up the challenge of reconciling these two demands. On the one hand they are calling on the Mexican state to recognize indigenous peoples' rights to self-determination within the framework of a reformed nation-state;
on the other they are struggling within their own communities and organizations for a critical re-thinking of their prevailing normative systems. 7 In response both to autonomist/Zapatista and government discourses, organized indigenous women have pointed out that while gender inequalities exist within state law, they also exist within so-called indigenous law (or 'customary law'). They have confronted the essentialist perspectives of some sectors of the indigenous movement, which glorify certain cultural traditions, arguing instead in favor of change. As one document from the organized indigenous women's movement states: 'we want to find paths through which we may view tradition with new eyes, in such a way that will not violate our rights and will 4 restore dignity to indigenous women. We want to change those traditions that diminish our dignity.' Much of the evidence presented in this paper derives from an investigation into the ways in which national law and indigenous customary law operates in response to indigenous women's demands for justice in Chiapas within this new political context.
With the participation of Tzeltal, Chol and Tzotzil women, an interdisciplinary research team explored the extent to which both national law and indigenous customary law responded to women's denunciations of sexual and domestic violence. 10 The experiences and concerns of indigenous women that emerged during the course of the research highlighted the dangers of affording primacy to idealized notions of 'indigenous culture' and indigenous customary law. Such dichotomized perceptions tend to understand 'indigenous law' as reflecting a completely different cultural logic to 'national law': the former supposedly being guided by an ethos of conciliation, rather than that of punishment, which is ascribed to the national legal system. However, by idealizing indigenous normative systems, such approaches singularly fail to recognize the unequal power relations that exist within indigenous communities, particularly gender inequalities. In practice, leaving the resolution of conflicts over sexual and domestic violence to local indigenous authorities often means lack of access to justice for women.
Women's experiences with national and traditional authorities have revealed the networks and inequalities of power that exist at the various levels of both justice systems. Providing greater autonomy for indigenous communities is not in and of itself sufficient to ensure the 'dignity and integrity' of indigenous women. Proposals advanced by indigenous women proposals to 're-invent tradition' under new terms signal a need to re-define the traditional debate between cultural relativism -which puts a primacy on the need to respect cultural differences -and universal values, such as human rights and women's rights. Respect for the rights of indigenous people does not mean the abandonment of universal values in the name of 'respecting culture'. Rather we need to consider how universal values, such as human rights, are understood, translated and claimed in local contexts, and which political and legislative strategies will ensure the greatest access to justice for those to whom it has traditionally been denied.
Antecedents: the Constitutional Amendment and its Political Uses
On 28 January 1992, the Mexican government approved an amendment to the Fourth Article of the Constitution, which recognized the multicultural character of the nation. 'We, the Yaqui, Mixe, Nahuatl, Tojobal, and Tlapaneca women….come from afar to speak our word in this land of Chiapas [...] During these two days we have talked about the violence we experience within our communities, at the hands of our husbands, the caciques, and the military; of the discrimination we are subjected to both as women and as Indians, of how our right to own land is denied us and about how we want women's opinions to be taken into account [...] We want an autonomy with a woman's voice, face, and consciousness, in order that we can reconstruct the forgotten female half of our community'. (cited in Gutiérrez and Palomo, 1999:67) 12
The demands of the women at ANIPA echoed the demands of Zapatista women. The latter, however, have concentrated their efforts on expanding the concept to include women's autonomy within the larger autonomy of indigenous peoples. This gender perspective was developed in a proposal read to the National Indigenous Congress (Congreso Nacional Indígena), in October 1996 by women from Chiapas, Oaxaca, Guerrero, Querétaro, Veracruz, San Luis Potosí, Estado de México, Mexico City and
Puebla. This referred to economic autonomy (defined as the right of indigenous women to have equal access and control over means of production), political autonomy (their basic political rights), physical autonomy (to have control over their own bodies and to live without violence), and socio-cultural autonomy (defined as the right to maintain specific identities as indigenous people).
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Equality and the Recognition of Difference
Opponents of proposals for greater indigenous autonomy in Mexico have argued that the legal recognition of rights based on notions of cultural difference and tradition is unjustifiable because the colonial origins of many institutions and cultural traditions of indigenous people mean they are not 'authentic' or 'pure' (Viqueira, 1999) . Adherents to a liberal discourse of universal rights have also opposed proposals for autonomy and the legal recognition of ethnic difference on the grounds that such measures will merely deepen inequalities between mestizo and indigenous societies (Bartra, 1992 , Viquiera, 1999 . However, indigenous women's efforts to critically reframe 'tradition' and to recast autonomy proposals in such a way that they guarantee the universal human rights of women has demonstrated that a multicultural project to recognize difference does not necessarily conflict with liberal notions of equality, rights and social justice.
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Throughout the twentieth century the Mexican government's policies towards the indigenous population were influenced at different times by discourses promoting equality and discourses promoting difference. The historical record has shown that the promotion of equal treatment for those who stand on unequal grounds has, in practice, denied the indigenous population's access to justice. Paradoxically, however, the Mexican government's recognition of a different cultural logic has also served to justify the exclusion and marginalization of indigenous peoples in the name of culture.
After the 1917 Revolution Mexico's political class attempted to build a modern, homogeneous and mestizo nation. Spanish was imposed as the national language, denying indigenous peoples the right to use their languages. Laws were implemented which did not take the cultural context of plaintiffs and defendants into account, and which indigenous people did not understand. Indigenous political and religious institutions were disempowered, and new mestizo municipal authorities took over the political and economic power of entire regions. 16 All these impositions took place in the name of the 'right to equality': all Mexicans had to be treated equally, despite the cultural, economic, and social differences that characterized this legally imposed citizenship.
However, the much sought-after de jure recognition of the right to cultural difference achieved in the 1990s has not meant improved access to justice for indigenous peoples.
As indicated above, the practice of anthropological expert testimony by the Instituto Nacional Indigenista (National Indigenous Institute), INI, 17 and by other government institutions such as the CNDH, can prove to be a double-edged sword that disadvantages those with least power within indigenous communities. In the past, the de facto recognition of 'culture' in certain regions of Mexico was used as a pretext to justify the exclusion and marginalization of ethnic minorities, and to legitimize progovernment Indian cacicazgos and other practices. In effect, only those indigenous institutions useful for ruling elites were recognized as 'traditional'. In the name of 'respect for culture', indigenous women continue to be denied their right to own land, to inherit family property or to have political power. Today in the name of 'culture' the existence of paramilitary groups, funded and promoted by mestizo elites, is justified.
And in the name of 'culture' a sense of 'otherness' and of 'difference' is construed in order to distort and impede political alliances between indigenous and non-indigenous people. In sum, discourses which emphasize the right to equality and discourses which emphasize the right to difference can both be used to hide, reproduce, or deepen the marginalization and exclusion of indigenous peoples. Legal recognition of the right to difference that relies on dichotomized visions counterpoising 'state law' against 'indigenous customary law' can ultimately serve to reinforce such tendencies.
Anthropological Constructions of Law and Custom
The current debate between defenders and detractors of indigenous autonomy is but one more expression of the long-running debate over equality and difference which has marked the development of legal anthropology. Malinowski (1926) and RadcliffeBrown (1952) , considered by many to be the 'fathers' of legal anthropology, represent both sides of this debate. Malinowski believed in the universality of law, arguing that every society, including 'primitive' societies, establish rules of behavior. From his perspective, 'aboriginal' and 'western' normative systems were guided by the same logic, the ultimate goal of which was to respond to the economic and social interests of As these early examples indicate, the context of domination from which discourses around equality and difference emerge determines the uses to which they are put, irrespective of the political intentions of those advocating one or the other position.
Emphasizing equality can lead to an ethnocentrism, which imposes the western world-view as the looking glass that colors the social processes, institutions, and cultural practices of other societies. Similarly, emphasizing difference can serve as an instrument to 'orientalize' non-western societies, to transform these societies into the 'other' and thus permit a definition of western culture based on discourses of rationality and progress.
The difference between 'law' and 'custom' developed by Radcliffe-Brown, and upon which much of the later development of legal anthropology was based, originated in the eighteenth century definition of law as a contract between individuals. The religious concept of 'divine law' that prevailed prior to the Enlightenment was replaced by the idea of law as a contract between free individuals that would help overcome the chaos of the 'state of nature'. 'Custom' was subsequently conceptualized as that which opposed the free and rational contract of the 'law'. Just as it is impossible to imagine civilized man without the opposing concept of the savage, so, it could be argued, the concept of law cannot be conceived without the concept of custom. Throughout different historical periods, a diversity of cultural practices enforced within different contexts and authority structures were lumped together under the category of 'custom' in opposition to (western, rational) 'law'. In one sense then, 'custom' is the savage seen in the mirror of the -civilized -'law'.
In some contexts the discourse on cultural difference has obscured the relations of subordination that have given rise to and shaped the development of many of the cultural practices of groups considered 'non-western'. 18 Some of the pioneering works of legal anthropology in Chiapas suffer from this last failing (See Collier, 1973 , Hermite, 1964 . The analysis of dispute processes among Zinacantecans carried out by Jane Collier in the 1960s emphasized 'folk' concepts which related conflict to illness, by Laura Nader among the Zapotecans (and used also by Jane Collier in her analysis of Zinacatecan Law), Teresa Sierra has analyzed dispute processes among the Nahuas of Puebla, and contextualized these processes in the framework of relationships of domination with the nation-state. Sierra advocates an approach which analyzes the relations between dominant and dominated normative systems, which are articulated through strategies developed by indigenous people when they recur to one or other legal authority (See Sierra 1993 , 1995 , Sierra and Chenaut, 1995 .
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Advocates of alternative theoretical currents who claim to defend indigenous peoples have not only presented their 'cultural logic' as isolated and in opposition to the dominant 'culture', but have often given in to the temptation of presenting indigenous peoples as homogeneous and harmonious. Many well-intentioned anthropologists in
Mexico who became personally involved in the indigenous people's struggle thus tended to ignore internal contradictions within indigenous communities and restricted their criticism to the relationships of subordination that indigenous peoples are subjected to within the nation-state (Bonfil, 1987; Bartolomé, 1977; Stavenhagen, 1988; Varese, 1988) . This tendency to overlook indigenous heterogeneity and ignore internal conflicts in order to construct a homogeneous and harmonious 'other' was questioned by later studies and is even considered by some to be a new form of colonialism. Said (1978) famously referred to this tendency as 'orientalism', and However, while recognizing that national law reproduces inequalities, feminist legal anthropology has also explored the ways in which women have used it to challenge decisions of indigenous customary law they consider unjust (Chenaut 1999, Moore
1994). Analysis of processes of dispute resolution in indigenous communities has
shown that while conciliatory procedures may mitigate conflicts, more often than not they reaffirm the subordinate position of indigenous women (Collier 1995, Garza Caligaris 1999, Sierra n.d.). Many feminist perspectives are characterized by the tension between the analysis of normative systems as reproducers of gender inequality, and the recognition that some of these legal spaces are of strategic value to women for the construction of a more just life.
State Law vs. Indigenous Customary Law? The Many Faces of 'Custom'
An underlying premise of legal reforms to recognize indigenous norms and practices (usos y costumbres) is that state law and indigenous customary law are discrete, distinct systems informed by different cultural logics. This separation between 'state law' and 'custom' can be traced back to the very constitution of state law itself. In order to legitimate itself as a symbol of western rationality, national law has depended on 'custom' to represent backwardness and pre-modernity (see Fitzpatrick 1992). In the same manner 'custom', when constructed within legal and academic discourses as a homogeneous otherness, can only be imagined as an alter ego of western law. In other words, indigenous peoples' normative practices have been re-framed as 'customary law' in a continuous dialogue with colonial and postcolonial powers in order to legitimize the latter.
However, in contrast to supposed indigenous homogeneity, the politico-legal norms and traditions of indigenous peoples in Mexico are in fact highly heterogeneous. In some regions they reproduce concepts of justice and morality inherited from colonial religious authorities. In others indigenous world-views which link crime and conflict with illness, and conciliation and forgiveness with health are in evidence (see Collier 1973 ). Yet even though broad differences between the cultural logic underpinning indigenous and mestizo society can be discerned, indigenous law and national law are not isolated spheres: rather, the legal strategies of social actors who make recourse to both realms of justice means they are in continual interplay. Rather than the existence of two According to the majority of studies comparing the two, the indigenous legal system is based on 'tradition', while the national system is founded on the federal Constitution.
The former is administered by authorities appointed and controlled by the community, the latter by paid public functionaries; indigenous procedures are oral and flexible, in contrast to state legal proceedings which are written and schematic; lastly, indigenous law aims for conciliation, state law for punishment. 21 Although these typologies are not entirely without justification, in general they have been used to oversimplify very complex processes. 'Custom' and 'tradition' are disputed terms and are defined differently by different sectors of the community. Clearly traditional authorities and practices are not defined by the temporality of their origin: rather than a descriptive term applied to some kind of 'essence', 'tradition' is an interpretative term used to refer to a process (Handler and Linnekin, 1984) . Given that culture is constantly changing, conceptualizing something as 'traditional' affords it a specific symbolic value. As Linnekin states, '[c]ultural categories such as "tradition"
have a reflexive character; we invent them as we live and think about them; people's awareness of them as categories affects their meaning'. (Linnekin, 1982:250) . In other words, 'tradition' is socially constructed. Placing these constructions within wider frameworks of power allows us to understand why certain inventions of 'tradition' are legitimized and others are not. (See Ulin, 1995) . Yet 'tradition' is not only legitimized by the powerful. Some authors have analyzed how the past is re-invented in the historic 24 memory of marginalized peoples in order to legitimize their present struggles and diminish the homogenizing power of colonial and post-colonial governments. (Price, 1983 and 1990; Rappaport, 1990 .) Nonetheless, such readings are in danger of creating new dichotomies: the traditions invented by 'dominators' to help them maintain their power, counterpoised against the traditions invented by the 'dominated' in order to resist. Perhaps it is preferable to view tradition and custom as concepts born of a dialectic process of resistance and reproduction in which the state and the law have a productive capacity which enables the construction of certain identities, which in turn challenge the very definitions that gave them life.
In this way, autonomous Zapatista authorities reproduce hegemonic discourses, presenting themselves as the bearers of 'millennial traditions' and 'ancestral customs'.
Yet through this discourse they vindicate new forms of conflict resolution, which draw on elements of national and international law and reinvent new traditions in which women in particular have a more active role in community life. This process of normative synthesis and critical reflection was described by a member of Tierra y Libertad (Land and Liberty), one of the autonomous Zapatista authorities:
'When cases of domestic violence came before us, we referred first to the civil code and the penal code. [The cases] were interpreted according to national law, and then compared with our revolutionary indigenous law. We would then determine that national law wouldn't be applied, because the law of the government is almost invariably made against women rather than in their favor.
So we would set things straight, mainly by using the revolutionary law, which speaks of the rights of women. In this way people's knowledge was broadened, 25 they were shown how women have just as many rights as men'.
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Despite such evidence attesting to the innovative capacity of the autonomous authorities to reinvent 'customary law', in their political discourse indigenous normative systems continue to be labeled as ancestral traditions. In this way the Zapatista movement continues to uphold the officially engendered dichotomy between national law and indigenous law, although they using it in furtherance of indigenous demands for selfdetermination. Evidently, although 'custom', as much as law, is a social construction that legitimizes certain relations of domination, in some contexts it can play the role of resisting dominant powers. Nonetheless, as the case of San Juan Chamula and other
highland municipalities indicates, we should not conclude that 'resistance' is always an element of indigenous 'custom' per se.
Constructing Subordinated Identities
As indicated above, significant differences exist throughout Chiapas in the way that husband and asking them to behave better in the future. But whereas women were asked to comply with their conjugal obligations, men were only asked not to hit their wives again. In other words, the Zinacatecan solutions tended to confirm and reinforce the unequal relationship between men and women'. (Collier, 1995:10) .
The notion that a woman can be 'eloped' against her will, and that this constitutes a minor offense, rectifiable by marriage, is another idea shared by positive law and indigenous customary law. In many cases of 'rape' where legal assistance was sought from women's legal defense NGOs in Chiapas, the parents of the victim asked lawyers to negotiate 'reparation' in the form of a promise of marriage and payment of a dowry.
Cases tended to be pursued by the girls' (bilingual) fathers, and legal prosecutions for rape were often dropped if the accused agreed to the proposed settlement. Lawyers slowly came to understand that in many of these cases the feelings of the young victim were valued the least of all, and often her father did not even allow her to speak. In many instances, when they occurred beyond community boundaries, both the rapes themselves and the accusations of rape served as weapons in the hands of quarrelling political groups. 28 The situation, however, is not much better with state law, since
Chiapas distinguishes between kidnapping and forced elopement, assuming the latter has a romantic intention in contrast to the former. Legislation regarding elopement was formulated in the nineteenth century, when it was a common practice, and remains on the books. The law describes forced elopement as something that happens to women, whereas kidnapping happens to men. The penalty in cases of elopement is less severe than it is for kidnapping, and can usually be mitigated by 'reparation' through marriage.
Significantly, the law does not specify whether the woman needs to declare that she eloped intentionally in order to establish the crime as elopement.
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Clearly with regard to ideas about discipline, maternal responsibility, and the relations between men and women, law and custom overlap and mutually constitute each other. tradition, but they also lose the protections the community previously afforded them.
In short, legislating for equality or difference will not achieve a more just life for indigenous women if changes are not successfully implemented in the socio-economic and ideological structures that exclude women and construct them as passive victims.
The mechanisms that enforce these identities operate within families, in the educational system, the health system, the media, within religious institutions, and other forums. October 1996, Mexico City.
9 A comparative analysis of the Acuerdos de San Andres, with the counter-proposal the government offered after breaking the signed agreements can be found at www.laneta.apc.org . Much of the government's rejection of the agreements was based on the way in which recognizing autonomy compromised the central power of the state.
Government speakers argued that autonomy threatened 'national unity' and that autonomy would represent a step backwards in 'civilization'. The racist prejudices of government consultants were reflected in statements such as one that mentioned that there was a danger of indigenous peoples reverting to 'human sacrifices' if they were given autonomy (La Jornada, 4 March 1997) . The Zapatistas and the indigenous independent movement declared on several occasions that they did not want to separate (1987:289) 21 This contrasting characterization is present in the classical works for Oaxaca and
Chiapas by Nader, 1966 , 1969 , and Collier 1973 , and continues to hold sway in the anthropological debate, as shown in a recent paper by the Bolivian anthropologist Xavier Albó (2000). 22 The way in which various political sectors struggle for control of the 'authentic' tradition has been analyzed by George Collier (1994) in the case of the Zinacantán Tzotzil. 23 In some areas, such as Simojovel, the Catholic Church, through its Indigenous Pastoral, created a new religious structure, which re-invented traditional posts, taking up such terms as 'principals' and 'elders' councils'. In contrast to pre-existing civicreligious authorities, women can occupy public office (although only married women who occupy them together with their husbands). 
